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***In Situ Rationality:***  
**A Defense of Realism**

A significant concern of recent philosophy is the problem of how language and mind connect with the world. Given that linguistic and mental contents are conceptual, how can the mental include realistic, non-conceptual content? Of course, the variety of ways to be a realist are numerous.<sup>1</sup> One can be a direct realist, a metaphysical realist, a scientific realist, a naïve realist, a moral realist, an internal realist<sup>2</sup>, and so on. What all these views presumably have in common is some commitment to there being a difference between the way the world is and the way we take it to be. Reality, whatever that may be, exists independently of the mind. It surpasses the limits of human cognition and exceeds what is merely appearance. The problem for realism, of whatever variety, is to explain how we can refer to an objective, mind-independent world? I maintain that part of the solution lies in retaining a gap between mind and world. There are non-empirical constraints on rational cognition, but these constraints are inseparable from the world in which they operate.

The underlying attraction of realism, in all its forms, is that it builds on the common sense idea that there is something out there in the world upon which the truth of my beliefs depends. My thoughts do not determine reality, at least not in its totality. The tables and chairs in this room will continue to exist even if no one is perceiving them. Or, if not tables and chairs, at least objects like mountains and rivers are not simply constituted by the mind.

The alternative is to take the anti-realist stance that *all* objects are mind-dependent. The anti-realist position is grounded in the idea that even if there are objects or facts 'out there' in the world, we have no access to

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<sup>1</sup>'Realism' is, of course, an unclear term, but here I use the term only to refer to the general commitment to a difference between what the world is and what we take it to be. I argue that realism also requires an epistemic gap between conceptual schemes and non-conceptual content.

<sup>2</sup>Although called 'realism,' internal realism is generally held to be an anti-realist view. I include it here, however, because I will argue that once the distinction between conceptual scheme and non-conceptual content is re-introduced, internal realism becomes a defensible form of realism.

them. Cognitive contents must be conceptual; hence, cognition and knowledge cannot concern what is inherently non-conceptual. Anti-realists argue that we must reject the so-called Myth of the Given because whatever this ‘given’ may be (e.g., Kantian noumena), it is inaccessible and, thus, explanatorily irrelevant.

What contemporary realists and anti-realists often share, however, is the denial of what is typically called either a God’s eye point of view or a view from nowhere. A traditional notion of objectivity as absolute impartiality and value-neutrality isolates the structure of thought from its content. However, from Kant’s Copernican revolution to Neurath’s boat, philosophers have become increasingly more skeptical about the possibility of access to or knowledge of the world apart from the cognitive and linguistic structures that we use to structure our experiences. This shift has led, in many instances, to a denial of a gap between conceptual scheme and the content of thought.<sup>3</sup> Denying the gap between form and content threatens to undermine any notion of objectivity beyond internally agreed upon standards of justification. Thus, both realists and anti-realists are left with this problem: how to fix linguistic reference and mental content.

Although I do not have space to defend adequately this assumption, I believe that anti-realism, which lacks of the constraint provided by external content, cannot establish a sufficiently strong notion of objectivity to solve this problem.<sup>4</sup> Certainly, for those willing to abandon strong objectivity, this is no strike against anti-realism. However, I think the relativism inherent in anti-realism has potentially serious epistemic and moral consequences. Hence, we should maintain the gap between scheme and content, but not as an unbridgeable divide. To deny this gap is to lose any substantive claims to external, non-conceptual content as a constraint on belief and reference. And to lose this constraint is to undermine justification across discourses or across epistemic schemes. Putnam’s internal realism illustrates the necessity of an alternative explanation, serving as a good example of the dangers of denying the gap between scheme and content.<sup>5</sup>

To avoid substantive relativism, there needs to be a gap between scheme and content, there needs to be transcendental, non-naturalizable

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<sup>3</sup>See for example, Sellars, Putnam, Davidson, and McDowell.

<sup>4</sup>For a further discussion of this argument, see Heikes.

<sup>5</sup>The same problem occurs with views such as John McDowell’s ‘relaxed naturalism’ and Paul Moser’s ‘semantic foundationalism.’ I focus here on Putnam because I believe it to be largely correct in its criticisms and responses to standard Cartesian conceptions of objectivity. Also, the weaknesses in Putnam’s proposed solution highlight the need to maintain an epistemic gap between the mind and the world.

constraints on rationality. The problem lies in saying what these constraints are and in showing how these constraints are integrated with the empirical content on which they operate. The solution, I maintain, is in understanding the non-propositional foundation of rational cognition. At its ground, rationality is a non-propositional activity. It involves knowing how to formulate beliefs, construct meaningful utterances, and act in the world. It is not simply a propositional or a representational activity. Rationality, in fact, has a dual nature. It has both a narrow concern with facts about a thinker's internal mental states and also a broad concern with forming true beliefs and making good decisions.<sup>6</sup> Fundamentally, rationality is not about describing norms or principles of justification; it is an activity. The rational cognizer need not articulate the totality of her epistemic practices. In fact, our epistemic practices are, in many ways, opaque to us. Rather, to be rational, cognizers need simply to act rationally. The seeming paradox, of course, is that we must be capable of saying what constitutes rationality. On the surface, this may not appear a promising way to resolve issues of linguistic reference or mental content. However, only by placing rationality in the context of activity in the world, can we begin to see how to fix the reference of our linguistic utterances or to understand how we have thoughts about the world. The limits of rationality are both external and internal; they are both transcendental and empirical. Even if the nature of rationality is such that neither of these limits can be determinate, they need not be substantively relativistic.<sup>7</sup>

### *Internal Realism and Relativism*

One possible solution to bridging the divide between scheme and content is to deny any ontological or epistemological gap between the realm of concepts and the realm of sensibility.<sup>8</sup> This solution, however, ultimately sac-

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<sup>6</sup>For a more complete discussion of this point and how apriori rules of rationality can, perhaps, bridge this divide, see Wedgwood.

<sup>7</sup>My focus here is on how the concept of rationality plays a role in some of the problems generated by the realism/anti-realism debate. I maintain that rationality has both a theoretical and practical nature, but I do not have sufficient space to develop a thorough account of rationality in all its forms. One such attempt, though, is offered by Audi.

<sup>8</sup>I take Putnam's 'realism' as an example, but I do not mean to imply that his is the only form of realism to deny this gap. Rather, internal realism clearly illustrates why this solution is not available to any realist who asserts a difference between the

rifices the external realm as the arbiter of our beliefs. For these so-called realists, empirical content acts as a constraint on our conceptual capacities; it is what provides concepts with their significance. Yet if experience is some non-conceptual ‘given,’ if it is what Sellars calls a ‘self-authenticating nonverbal episode’ (Sellars 1963, 169), then the problem becomes how these episodes provide some epistemic foundation for further inferences. Sellars’ insight into the ‘myth of the given’ is to point out that *‘instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, and cannot account for it’* (Sellars 1963, 176). In other words, concepts allow us to order experience, but they cannot be grounded in non-conceptual ‘givens.’

The dilemma is which of two options one ought to pick: (1) maintaining that experience is itself conceptual and, thus, dependent on (or interdependent with) cognition, or (2) maintaining that independent reality exerts an influence on thought. The problem with the first option is that we lose contact with the empirical realm, leaving the conceptual realm completely unfettered from the world. The problem with the second option is that since judgment can only include what lies within the conceptual realm, the non-conceptual cannot serve as a reason. Internal realism, like many neo-Kantian/neo-Wittgensteinian options, proposes a third option: a complete denial of the epistemic gap between mind and world. The real advantage of internal realism is that it recognizes that we can no longer maintain a firm Cartesian divide between mind and world. The disadvantage is that internal realism fails to recognize that we cannot deny this gap entirely. The so-called solution of thoroughly merging mind and world is not only incapable of grounding any sort of realism, it cannot establish an external constraint sufficient to head off a substantive relativism of reference and cognition. It fails to establish what realism must establish: some meaningful difference between mind and world--and some meaningful connection between them.

I believe Putnam is right to start from the position that ‘there is no God’s Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve’ (Putnam 1981, 50). This commitment leads to a particular problem for realists: how objects of the world function as constraints on belief. Because Putnam de-

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way things are and the way we take them to be. For other examples of this see Moser 1993, 100-105 and McDowell 1994, 24-45.

nies the gap between mind and world, objects do not exist outside conceptual schemes, and hence, internal realism is unable to acknowledge a difference between the way the world is and the way we think about it.

While Putnam notably claims that meanings just ain't in the head, he nonetheless argues that reference can be determined only internally, within a language or description. His model theoretic argument demonstrates that the reference of terms can always be reinterpreted without altering the truth-values of the sentences in which the reinterpreted terms occur (Putnam 1981, 22-48, 217-218). He concludes that concepts do not inherently refer at all; rather, concepts are signs that have no reference apart from their use (see Putnam 1981, 18). Because objects correspond to concepts only when actually employed in a particular way by a particular community of users, it is possible within a scheme to say what matches what (Putnam 1981, 52). It just is not possible to do this matching independently of the conceptual scheme in which those objects exist. Nevertheless, Putnam argues that there are external constraints on reference and belief. 'Knowledge,' he claims, 'is not a story with no constraints except internal coherence' (Putnam 1981, 54). The problem is how to make such a claim coherently. Where exactly is the *external* constraint? Although there are no neutral perspectives and although mind and world are interdependent, internal realism's account of 'external' content is insufficient to constrain belief.

Putnam attempts to address this problem by responding to the implicit threat of relativism. The problem with relativism, according to Putnam, is that it considers every conceptual scheme as good as another as long as it is internally consistent. To defeat the relativist, Putnam utilizes Wittgenstein's private language argument (see Wittgenstein 1958, §258), claiming that the relativist cannot distinguish between being right and thinking one is right (Putnam 1981, 122). Although the relativist may attempt to claim that justification relative to a discourse is absolute, there can be, for the relativist, no justification across discourse (Putnam 1981, 121). Furthermore, the relativist supposedly cannot even claim justification within a discourse is absolute. To maintain such justification is to assert that there is in fact some notion of absolute truth. In short, Putnam maintains that the relativist fails to see that some kind of objective rightness is a presupposition of thought itself (Putnam 1981, 124). Ironically, this is the same problem internal realism has: it denies an objective rightness and, hence, cannot produce justification across discourse. Any view that denies an epistemic gap between mind and world can say only what the world

looks like from some perspective because there is no world independent of conceptual choices.<sup>9</sup>

The problem is that this is precisely to make the relativist claim that justification occurs only within a discourse; it is to deny an objective fit of concepts to objects in the world. One can never have access to the external inputs that supposedly constrain knowledge. If objects exist only within a scheme of description and if reference can only be fixed from within that description, there is nothing outside of the realm of concepts to constrain the freedom of those concepts. How, then, can the conceptual realm make use of empirical reality or sensible bits of experience in a way that allows external reality to play an explanatory role within a system of judgments?

*Representation and Rationality: A Guide to Active Objectivity*

The problems that must be overcome if realism is to survive closing the gap between conceptual or linguistic schemes and external content are troubling. If mind and world jointly make up mind and world, our descriptions of the world must be partly constitutive of that world. If all justification must be within a scheme or description, there can seemingly be no *objective* external constraint on knowledge. Hence, objective access to the external world seemingly disappears, and realism appears to dissolve into idealism. What we are left with is the particular perspectives of particular knowers. And since justification across discourse depends on shared epistemic goals and purposes, where these are lacking so too is rational justification. Relativism, then, emerges as a serious threat.

The dilemma here is the same difficult one as before: either assert some unexplainable, non-conceptual access to the world or allow that justification has no constraints external to the conceptual scheme of one's community. The choices are equally unsavory: a philosophically unsatisfying realism or a substantive and indefensible form of relativism. Surely there must be some intermediate option, an option that avoids the excesses and sins of both direct realism and relativism. This third option is to reject a God's eye conception of objectivity while insisting on a gap between mind and world (albeit not an unbridgeable gap).

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<sup>9</sup>According to Putnam: 'The elements of what we call "language" or "mind" penetrate so deeply into what we call "reality" that the very project of representing ourselves as being "mappers" of something "language-independent" is fatally compromised from the very start' (Putnam 1981, 28).

This solution demands that we take seriously reason's active engagement with the world. Concepts, to be anything, must be applied in our everyday lives.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, this solution also relies on an apriori conception of rationality as a dynamic, continuously changing source of objectivity. The basic idea is this: rationality is ultimately grounded in a non-propositional interaction with a world independent of it. While this world is, of necessity, partly constituted by rational cognition, rational thought and activity require a world in which to operate. Our grasp of the world may be heavily propositional and conceptual, but there is more to the world and to rationality than merely what we can think or say about it.

In the remainder of this paper, I will elaborate and explain how rationality operates in producing objectivity. The central task for such a theory of rationality is to explain the objective constraints on cognition while simultaneously acknowledging the inherently subjective features of cognition. The dual elements of objectivity and subjectivity respect the diversity of epistemic goals and purposes that exist while simultaneously providing a ground on which to resist the assertion that all these goals and purposes are all equally good. Apriori conditions of rational cognition establish the ground for making principled distinctions among competing epistemic perspectives. In addition, these apriori conditions provide the needed gap between mind and world. The key to understanding apriori rationality, however, is to recognize that it exists only as an activity within the empirical world. This means that there can be no determinate content for rational beliefs.

So, what makes this view realist? And how in the world does this notion of apriori rationality work, really? In order to explain this, I shall use an analogy with artistic representation. All forms of realism must, at some level, be committed to there being a difference between how things are and how we take them to be. This is as true in art as it is in philosophy: what counts as realistic representation in art is simultaneously rule-governed and open-ended. Despite the enormous variety of artistic representation (and even the complete lack of representation in many instances), not just anything goes in the realm of art. There are standards for what constitutes 'good art,' and we can say what these standards are. However, like the epistemic, linguistic, and cognitive schemes of various philosophical views, the standards for artistic judgment are likewise internal. For example, all things being equal, it is not legitimate to fault Picasso's *Les*

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<sup>10</sup> See Kant 1965, A133/B172-A134/B174; also see Wittgenstein 1958, §201, 217.

*Demoiselles d'Avignon* for not making use of a single perspective. In fact, offering such a criticism shows a fundamental lack of understanding of his work. Similarly, one cannot legitimately criticize Cézanne for failing to provide enough detail in his *Bathers* or criticize Matisse for his surrealistic use of color in *The Dance*. The problem with such criticism is not that it says something false; rather, it is that such criticism fails to address the work within the proper context. Legitimate criticism of any particular work of art must address the standards with respect to which the art is created. The rules for art criticism may be internal to a specific context—and they may often be highly contentious, but art criticism does not allow just any sort of evaluation. Art is governed by rigorous, albeit often indeterminate, standards. What we are willing to consider an interesting artistic problem, or an interesting solution to that problem, may lack the widespread agreement found in other epistemic tasks (e.g., mathematics or physics); nevertheless, there are clear standards for what makes a work of art good, whether that piece be cubist, surrealist, or abstract expressionist. Not just anyone (much less the proverbial five year-old) can pick up a paintbrush and produce work of the quality of Klee's *Twittering Machine*, Munch's *The Scream*, or even Magritte's *The Treason of Images*.

Are such works, then, bound only by internal standards of aesthetic judgement? Perhaps (but only perhaps) in the realm of purely non-representational work, this may be the case.<sup>11</sup> In the realm of representational art, however, this is certainly not true. Representational art is about how things are (out there, in the world) as well as how we take them to be. Like all re-presenters, artists take the world and filter it in various ways. The key here is that representation must start with the world—and with the limits of one's medium. What the artist does with the world depends, in part, upon her medium, her vision, and her talent. The result can be good or bad or something in between, but the basis for judgment will include not only criteria internal to the method and medium of representation--it will also include the world.

For example, Picasso's *Guernica* is a powerful piece not simply because Picasso was a master at putting paint on canvas. He captured and eloquently expressed events in the world. Without the world, the painting would be quite different--and judged by somewhat different standards. Representational works of art need not be photo-realistic, but they must somehow be tied to the objects and events they represent. *Guernica* is al-

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<sup>11</sup>This contrast with non-representational work is significant, but I do not here have adequate space to deal with the issues surrounding non-representational work.



most universally taken to be a powerful representation and denunciation of the violence of war. But how is it that we so clearly recognize this in a piece lacking in literal representation? Prior to the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, few people would have acknowledged *Guernica* as a skilled representation of war. Few would have seen the representational qualities of Duchamp's *Nude Descending a Staircase No.2*. In part, this is the case because only recently is there widespread acceptance of the idea of multiple perspectives and the idea that our cognitive structures are partially constitutive of objects. Today, however, most people, at least in industrialized societies, recognize some obviousness in the claim that the world is partly what we take it to be. We learn to see the world in certain ways, and art reflects and pushes the boundaries of how we see and represent the world in which we live.

Beyond the realm of art, this interdependence of mind and world has clear application in the claims of quantum mechanics, where the act of observation influences the event. Similarly, in fields such as cognitive psychology, the assumption is that our thoughts dictate our reality in substantive ways. What the facts mean is what we take them to mean, so that the mind and world really do jointly make up the mind and the world. The result is that what counts for realism, or even common sense realism, is neither clear nor immutable. What it means for your average cognizer to be a realist is not absolutely determined any more than the content of, say, specific paintings are absolutely determined: who paints the painting makes a difference, even when the painters are working from the same scene. Realism is not determinate in its content. Even our everyday theories about the world serve as theories concerning what it means to be a realist.

But why should this matter? How could noting the flexibility of realism possibly save us from a substantive relativism? Would this not, in actuality, defeat claims of there being a difference between the world and how we perceive it? If realism cannot be divorced from the ways we talk about it, why is this not merely to assert a version of idealism or anti-realism? If reality is knowable only from within cognitive structures, why do we not lose the epistemic constraint provided by a realm outside of cognitive content? Precisely due to their interdependence there *is* a distinction between cognitive structures and empirical events; it is just that the gap between them is not nearly as wide as it has typically been portrayed.

The form and matter of cognition cannot be meaningfully divorced from one another, even in theory. However, they can be distinguished from one another by examining rationality *in situ*. The concept of realism by which we attempt to hold onto ordinary objects like tables and ice cubes

depends on the structure of our epistemology. What beliefs we hold, the coherence of those beliefs, and how they serve to account for experience determines much of our ontology. For example, it is obvious to someone versed in modern chemistry that ice cubes are composed of water molecules or  $H_2O$ , but such obviousness is contingent. It depends upon the person living in a society in which molecular theory is understood and accepted. Despite the fact that few of us ever ‘experience’ the elements of the periodic table, there are sensory impressions be better understand through the hypostatization of these objects. However, the range of empirically viable options for such a metaphysical ordination are limited by more than mere sensory inputs or empirically grounded epistemologies. Because our methods of constructing experience are constrained by apriori limits on rational belief, experience is not simply what we make of it. The general constraints on rational cognition transcend empirical limits, although their interpretation cannot.

These issues of representation have a parallel in art. A painting of a tree can take various forms depending on the artist (i.e., the painting could be impressionistic, expressionistic, realistic, and so on), but there are limits beyond which the painting will cease to represent a tree. Similarly, in the realm of mental representation, my internal mental states, my subjective experiences, and my ways of relating experiences may make a particular judgment or action rationally permissible for me, but there are limits to what I can *rationally* believe. While the limits inherent in painting may be very different from the limits inherent in sculpture or in photography, each of these mediums has its own limits, and these limits are independent of the particular artists who utilize them. In the same way, different epistemic perspectives set different constraints on rational belief and action, but there are further limits beyond which we can no longer recognize beliefs and actions as rational. In both art and cognition, the limits inherent in the activity are not all that we must respect; there is also the world, the ‘given’ that must be confronted. Not just anything goes in the realm of art or in the realm of rationality; yet what is permissible cannot be decided merely from the actual activity of creating art or of rationally encountering the world. Within the realms of art and cognition, there is a difference between good and bad art or good and bad cognition. Yet, such standards can be articulated only in actual practice.

A further example of this point can be found in anthropology. Recently, the *Journal of Human Evolution* published an article arguing that modern human behavior developed much earlier than previously accepted

(more specifically, 70,000 years ago, not 40,000 years ago) (see Henshilwood 2001). The evidence for this claim lies in the discovery of ‘formal bone working, deliberate engraving on ochre, production of finely made bifacial points and sophisticated subsistence strategies’ (Henshilwood 2001, 631). Such activity is taken by Henshilwood and his associates to indicate the presence of rational thought, but it does so only because anthropologists operate with a pre-conceived understanding of rationality and human behavior. There are some things (e.g., deliberate use of tool-making technologies and expressions of symbolism) that are not found in the absence of rational thought; therefore, these people must have been rational. Anthropologists’ understanding of rationality, in effect, sets the limits of who is and is not considered rational. The concept of rationality here is not absolutely determinate. There are no necessary and sufficient conditions on rationality. However, it does show that there are conditions which set the limits of what we understand as rational behavior. For the interpretation of the data, or more broadly, for the interpretation of experience, we need not only the specific empirical concepts and rules for ordering our experience, we need some further *apriori* constraints on what counts as a *rational* synthesis of experience.

Anthropology, like any science, is empirically grounded. The concept of rationality used by those investigating the origins of human behavior need not be transcendental. It may just be the case that societies have working definitions of rationality, definitions that fit within our current theories but that are purely a product of whatever theories we endorse. While *a posteriori* foundations may be acceptable within various scientific theories, they cannot be universally acceptable. If rationality is merely what we decide or believe it to be, then there can be only internal standards for rational cognition. Objectivity and normativity require some standards across various perspectives, even if those standards are not entirely determinate. There are limits beyond which I can no longer view a person as rational.

Take, for example, the Principle of Charity. When I interpret someone’s utterances, I should do so in such a way that her beliefs come out mostly true. Someone who holds too many contradictory beliefs will be unintelligible. Further, the person who holds too many contradictory beliefs will have trouble coping with the world. To make a claim to rationality in this instance is to violate a very basic understanding of the normative limits on belief and action. The specific content of those beliefs and actions may vary greatly, but the most general attributions of rationality al-

low for this flexibility of content. What such attributions do not allow is too wide a divergence from basic constraints such as the requirement that we hold largely consistent beliefs or that we attribute qualities to objects. Such constraints function as absolute limits beyond which rationality cannot go. They are the ground for specific rules of rationality that are exhibited through evidence of activities such as the bone working or engraving recognized by anthropologists.

Taking the law of non-contradiction and subject-predicate attributions as examples of these general apriori constraints, it is still the case that our application and interpretation of them will, of necessity, be grounded in concrete epistemic perspectives. These constraints only operate in the context of encounters with the world, but how they are applied is open-ended. There are no determinate applications or interpretations of rules. So, why is this not merely to push the relativity back a further level? Wittgenstein's metaphor of the spade hitting bedrock is a good one here. What fixes the interpretation when explanations have been exhausted? What does one say when asked to defend interpretations of apriori rules of rationality, of linguistic utterances, of mental content? One says, this is simply what I do. The context makes all the difference here because rationality must always have a context. Less directly, but more clearly, perhaps, the answer goes back to the flexibility, as well as the inflexibility, of realism. What the world is may depend, in part, on how I represent it—or on how the artist paints it. However, the world cannot be just anything I, or the artist, or the anthropologist want it to be. Similarly, 'rationality' can mean many things, but it cannot mean just anything. For each of these concepts, their limits can be found by placing them in the context of lived experience and knowing how.

What it means to be rational and what it means to be a realist, then, is contextually determined in actual living. And this is the heart of *in situ* rationality. A child does not grasp certain principles of rationality prior to *being* rational. And what determines the references of our thoughts and language is not determined prior to the use of cognition and language for certain purposes. Human activity and living in the world is the foundation. Cognition is partly about judgment, but it cannot be entirely a matter of judgment for humans are capable of activity prior to judgment. Besides, judging is itself an *activity* of interpreting rules, an activity which has no further rules for how to apply the rules it does. The context, then, becomes central to the judging. The context provides the content without which apriori rules of rationality are useless. While the apriori limits of rationality

fix the range of interpretations, the context of my experience—of my interaction with the world around me—fixes the reference of my thoughts and utterances. However, neither apriori constraints nor external content does so in an absolutely determinate manner. Rationality is ultimately an interaction of the two, and neither its nature nor its content can ever be specified in its entirety. It need not be; it is simply evidence of human activity.

#### **ABSTRACT**

For some time now, there has been disagreement about the gap, or lack of one, between conceptual schemes and non-conceptual content about the world. In order to avoid problems highlighted by the so-called Myth of the Given, many philosophers deny such a gap. I argue, however, that to deny this gap is to commit oneself to relativism, regardless of how forcefully one resists. There is, however, also a problem with asserting a gap between the way the world is and how we take it to be: to explain how conceptual schemes incorporate non-conceptual content. The solution is a conception of rationality that refuses to divorce the theoretical aspects of cognition from the activity of reason in the world. In short, mind-world connections must always be taken on a case-by-case basis.

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